Jammu’s counter-terror grid
Context:
The Jammu region has recently garnered attention due to a troubling surge in terrorist activities, leading to significant losses for the security forces. This escalation, notably over the last few months, is largely attributed to the weakened counter-terrorism grid in the region.
- A critical shift in the deployment of troops to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) following the Galwan incident in June 2020 has left the Jammu region vulnerable.
Relevance:
GS-03 (Security)
Dimensions of the Article:
- What is the Issue?
- Cause of the Issue
- Challenges Associated
- Operation Dudhi
What is the Issue?
- The Jammu region, which includes sensitive areas such as Kathua, Poonch, and the Chenab valley, has seen a spike in terrorist activities.
- This surge is partly due to the redeployment of troops to the LAC, leaving the region’s counter-terrorism grid weakened.
- The security forces, traditionally tasked with maintaining a strong presence to prevent terrorist movements and operations, have faced significant challenges in the absence of a fully functional grid.
- The recent induction of around 3,000 Army troops and 500 Special Forces units highlights the government’s response to the deteriorating security scenario. However, the situation raises concerns about the effectiveness and preparedness of these newly inducted forces, especially those unfamiliar with the region’s unique dynamics.
Cause of the Issue:
- Troop Redeployment to LAC: The Galwan incident in June 2020 marked a significant shift in India’s defense priorities, leading to the redeployment of a substantial number of troops from the Jammu region to the LAC. This reallocation left the region’s counter-terrorism grid vulnerable, creating gaps that terrorist groups exploited.
- Increased Terrorist Infiltration: The weakened security grid allowed for increased infiltration by terrorist groups, often supported by Pakistan. The porous borders and difficult terrain made it easier for these groups to enter and establish themselves in the region.
- Lack of Familiarity Among Newly Inducted Troops: The induction of troops unfamiliar with the terrain and local dynamics poses a challenge. Effective counter-terrorism operations require a deep understanding of the area, its people, and the local support networks that can either aid or hinder operations.
Challenges Associated:
- Establishing an Effective Grid: A counter-terrorism grid is not merely about numerical strength but about strategic deployment. It requires a deep understanding of the terrain, potential vulnerable areas, and the inclinations of the local population. The grid must be established in a way that prevents terrorist movement while gaining the trust of the local community.
- Gaining Local Support: The success of counter-terrorism operations heavily depends on winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Security forces must gain the confidence of the people to obtain vital intelligence and support. This is particularly challenging for newly inducted troops who are unfamiliar with the local dynamics.
- Integration of New Troops: Integrating newly inducted troops into the existing grid is a complex process. These troops must be superimposed on already deployed units to ensure continuity and effectiveness. Deploying them independently without sufficient understanding of the area could lead to operational failures.
Operation Dudhi:
- Operation Dudhi serves as a historical example of successful counter-terrorism operations in the region.
- Conducted in May 1991 by the 7 Assam Rifles, this operation in the Chowkibal area of Jammu and Kashmir remains a benchmark in military strategy.
- The operation was executed primarily under the battalion’s command, demonstrating the effectiveness of allowing commanding officers to lead operations without excessive external interference.
Way Forward:
- Strengthening the Counter-Terrorism Grid: The counter-terrorism grid in Jammu needs to be reinforced, not just in numbers but in strategy. Newly inducted troops should be integrated with existing units, ensuring that their deployment is strategic and not merely for numerical augmentation.
- Enhancing Local Engagement: Building trust with the local population is crucial. Security forces must focus on community engagement, winning over the neutral majority to isolate terrorist elements. This requires long-term deployment and continuous interaction with the local communities.
- Learning from Past Operations: The lessons from successful operations like Operation Dudhi should be incorporated into current strategies. Commanding officers must be empowered to lead operations, ensuring that decision-making is swift and responsive to on-ground realities.
- Training and Familiarization: Newly inducted troops should undergo extensive training focused on the specific challenges of the Jammu region. This includes familiarization with the terrain, understanding local customs, and building psychological operations aimed at gaining the trust of the local population.
- Sustained Operations: Counter-terrorism efforts in Jammu must be viewed as a long-term commitment. Expecting quick results can lead to hasty and ineffective strategies. The security forces need to be in for the long haul, with a focus on sustained operations that gradually erode the capabilities of terrorist groups.
- Coordination Among Forces: Effective coordination among various security forces, including the Army, Assam Rifles, and local police, is essential. Joint operations and intelligence sharing can enhance the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism grid.
- Monitoring and Adapting Strategies: The security scenario in Jammu is dynamic, requiring constant monitoring and adaptation of strategies. The government and military leadership must be flexible in their approach, adjusting troop deployments and tactics based on the evolving threat landscape.