A Slow Path to Peace in J&K

A Slow Path to Peace in J&K


#GS 03 Internal Security

Present circumstances:

  • According to a recent report, the Union government is apparently discussing a “strategy to withdraw the Indian Army completely from the Valley region.”
  • Only with permission will the Army be allowed to stay near the Line of Control (LoC). Once the Army withdraws, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the J&K police may assume command of the counterterrorism operations, beginning with a few Kashmiri localities.

Army leaving the valley because:

  • This choice was motivated by the decline in violence that has occurred in J&K since the judgements were taken on August 5, 2019.
  • journey’s end journey’s heart journey’s love function’s desire for others
  • Sometimes it does result in major emergency situations in schools.
  • This has previously occurred. For instance, between 2007 and 2009, two divisions were taken out of J&K’s counterterrorism operations and put back into service.
  • In order to strengthen the deployment along the Line of Actual Control, two brigades from Kashmir were also transferred to Ladakh (LAC).
  • Also, it will end the labour shortage.
  • The Army also faces a manpower shortage. There is currently a 1,20,000 soldier shortage as a result of the Covid-19 two-year recruitment ban, and there are no plans to fill the gap through new hiring.
  • The manpower scarcity has gotten worse as a result of the increasing army deployment along the LAC to address the problem that erupted in Eastern Ladakh in 2020. Every time internal security responsibilities are scaled back, the Army has the opportunity to appropriately size its force organisation.
  • In actuality, the Army has been thinking about this. A unit would have four instead of six RR companies, and a portion of the sector and force headquarters would be disbanded.
  • The LAC in Eastern Ladakh has also already seen the deployment of several RR units. The Army’s presence in the hinterland would be greatly diminished when all of this is taken into account.

The following elements must be considered when removing the Soldiers from the valley:

  • What constitutes normalcy must be determined by looking at the internal and external factors that have prevented the problem from being resolved.
  • The external force is weaker now. Pakistan has liberally sponsored terrorism in J&K in the past, but it has less influence over the situation now.
  • This is because Pakistan has serious issues with its politics, economy, and internal security, and because India has responded forcefully to terrorist attacks that bear the stamp of Pakistan.
Interior Elements:
  • It is vital to manage the security situation, fight radicalism, meet the needs of the public, advance economic development, and resume political involvement in order to address internal factors.
  • Lessons learned from the past demonstrate that the mere presence of violence does not signify normalcy. In 2012, fewer than half as many people were killed in terrorist attacks as in 2022, but because the underlying causes of the conflict in J&K were not addressed, the situation continued to deteriorate.
  • Even though the security situation is calm right now, it would be prudent to take more time to fully resolve the other issues. This would ensure that J&K remains stable even in the absence of the Army.

Phases of the military’s transition:

  • The CRPF should gradually expand into new areas. The starting point could be in the Jammu region, where the CRPF is fully in charge of terrorist operations.
  • A small number of RR units could be kept on hand in case of any unanticipated events.
  • Trying to hand over certain districts in Kashmir is not encouraged, though, since this could raise issues with operational integrity, intelligence collecting, and command and control with nearby forces operating under separate ministries.

Phasing is advised for two main reasons:

  • The Army, CRPF, and J&K police now collaborate on missions, with each agency contributing its particular specialisation. They include not just the highly skilled soldiers, but also the logistical, communicational, engineering, and medical support that is essential to the Army as a whole. In the absence of the Army, this competency vacuum would need to be filled, and the initial deployment of the CRPF in the Jammu region might impart crucial lessons in this regard before they begin their duties in the Kashmir valley.


  • The government’s recommendation that after things get back to normal, the Army forces stationed in J&K for counterterrorism operations should be reduced has some value.
  • Also, this would be a relief for the Army, which is facing manpower reductions while increased operational responsibilities. But because J&K’s successes have come at a high cost, it would be wise to proceed with prudence and withdraw the Army in a graded and staged fashion.